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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
: Criminal No. 9707
Plaintiff-Respondent, :J Supreme Court No. 860063
VS.

;

DOUGLAS CARTER,

:
s:

Argument Priority
Classification No. 1

Defendant-Appellant. :

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when it

denied the defendant's motion for change of venue?
II.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when it

admitted photographs of the homicide victims which were unduly
prejudicial and not probative of essential facts?
III.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when it

denied the defendant's motion to suppress his confession?
IV.

Do Utah's sentencing proceedings for capital felony

cases violate due process when the statutory aggravating factors,
which are necessary elements of the capital crime, are also the
aggravating factors considered by the jury in determining whether
to impose the death sentence?
V.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when it

instructed the jury that it could consider any evidence which
had been admitted in the guilt portion of the trial, in addition
to the evidence admitted in the penalty portion?

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant Douglas Carter was charged with the commission
of a capital felony involving the death of Eva Oleson, the aunt of
Provo Police Chief Swen Nielsen.

The homicide was alleged to have

occurred on the 27th of February, 1985.
On June 11, 1985, Sergeant Cunningham arrested the defendant at
the apartment of Ms. JoAnne Robins.

Ms. Robins had befriended the

defendant and provided him with a place to stay.

Ms. Robins had

three children, ages 8, 9 and 13. (R. 312). Upon his arrest, the
defendant was concerned with what would happen to his girl friend,
Ms. Robins. (R. 280, 314-8).

The defendant asked about her five

or six times during each of the two five-hour long interrogation
sessions. (R. 281, 317). The police officers testified that they
informed the defendant that she was arrested for harboring a
fugitive. (R. 257). The defendant knew the statement was true
because he had seen Ms. Robins in the jail holding area.

The

defendant testified that the officers promised if he would
confess, they would release Ms. Robins. (R. 314, 320). He states
that every time he raised the issue of Ms. Robins1 status, they
told him that she was arrested and would be going to prison.

On

one occasion, they told him that her children would be placed in
foster care.

(R. 314, 318).

The preliminary hearing was held on the 25th of June, 1985 at
which the defendant was represented by E. Duke McNeil, attorney at
law.

Defendant was bound over to the Fourth Judicial District

Court for arraignment.
2

On July 26, 1985, defendant was arraigned before Judge Cullen
Y. Christensen, at which time the defendant entered a plea of not
guilty.

The case was assigned to Judge Cullen Y. Christensen for

trial to begin on October 3/ 1985.

Trial was rescheduled to

begin December 12, 1985 at 9:30 a.m. upon the request of counsel
for the defendant.
On the 29th day of November, 1985, the defendant, through
counsel, filed a Motion to Suppress Statements together with
supporting Memorandum of Law and supporting Affidavits.

Further,

the defendant, through counsel, filed a Notice of Insanity Defense
or in the Alternative the Defense of Diminished Mental Capacity
and a Motion for Change of Venue.
filed on November 29, 1985.

Said motions were likewise

The motions were scheduled for

hearing on December 9, 1985.
On December 9, 1985, counsel for the parties and the parties
appeared and the trial court heard evidence on defendant's Motion
to Supress and Motion for Change of Venue.
taken under advisement by the court.

The motions were

On December 10, 1985,

additional evidence was submitted by counsel for the defendant
pertaining to the Motion for Change of Venue, whereupon the Court
denied the Motion for Change of Venue and also denied the Motion to
Suppress (R. 63). On the 11th day of December, 1985 counsel for
the defendant moved the court to allow for the withdrawal of his
Notice of Insanity Defense and Diminished Mental Capacity.

The

court heard argument on said motion and allowed defendant to
withdraw his Notice of Insanity Defense and Diminished Mental
3

Capacity (R. 65) .
The trial began on December 12, 1985 with voir dire
examination of the jurors and ended on December 19, 1985 with the
jury's decision that the defendant should receive the death
penalty.
Jury qualification began on December 12, 1985 and continued
until December 13, 1985 in the evening.

During this two-day

process, 47 jurors were questioned relative to their knowledge
regarding the case, their backgrounds, whether they had formed an
opinion regarding the case, and their feelings about the death
penalty (R. 498-1006).

At the end of this procedure, 30 jurors

were qualified, from which a jury of 12 was selected.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court committed prejudicial error by failing to grant a
change of venue.

In view of the unusually concentrated and

regionally publicized nature of this case, this failure to change
venue resulted in a panel of jurors who were more than casually
informed of the case.
The trial court committed error in allowing admission of
photographs of the victim which were unduly prejudicial,
inflammatory and not probative of essential facts.

The chance

that the jury would base its decision out of passion was
enhanced by such evidence.

The photos were not necessary to

establish any facts, and were cumlative of the other competent
evidence introduced.
The trial court committed error by failing to grant
4

defendant's Motion to Suppress.

The defendant's confession was

not voluntary, but was induced by police officers who led
defendant to believe that he must confess to the crime under
investigation or an innocent girl friend and her children would
suffer.
Utah's statutory scheme, in which the statutory aggravating
factors, also elements of the capital crime, are the
aggravating factors considered by the jury in determining whether
to impose the death penalty, violates due process.

The jurors

who have convicted the defendant have already found beyond a
reasonable doubt the aggravating factors during the guilt phase.
They are then instructed that they must find aggravating factors
in the penalty phase and apply the same reasonable doubt standard.
The jurors are already predisposed toward death because finding
that the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt requires some mental gymnastics that are
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a layperson to do.
Reasonable minds could not have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that the totality of the aggravating factors completely
outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that the imposition of the death penalty was justified and
appropriate under the circumstances.

There was substantial

evidence of mitigation and little evidence of aggravation, other
than the actual commission of the crime.
The court erred in allowing the jury to consider any evidence
which had been admitted during the guilt phase of the trial in
5

considering the penalty to be imposed.

Such procedure is not

susceptible to meaningful review, in that the reviewing court
cannot determine the validity of the factors which were considered
by the jury in arriving at their determination to impose the death
sentence.

It is, therefore, constitutionally infirm that the

death penalty may be imposed in an arbitrary and discriminatory
manner.

Such procedure is further prejudicial in that there may

be evidence introduced during the guilt phase which is competent
for a limited purpose, but which is not competent evidence if
offered in the penalty phase.
POINT I
THE COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CHANGE OF
VENUE WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The Utah Constitution provides that, in criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall have the right to a trial "by an impartial
jury...11 Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 12.
Utah Code Ann., § 77-35-29(e) (198C as amended) deals with the
bases that may be employed by a defendant to request a change of
venue.

That subsection, also known as Rule 29 of the Utah Rules

of Criminal Procedure, provides as follows:
If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal
action believes that a fair and impartial trial
cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the action
is pending, either may, by motion, supported by an
affidavit setting forth facts, ask to have the
trial of the case transferred to another jurisdiction.
If the court is satisfied that the representations
made in the affidavit are true and justify transfer of
the case, the court shall enter an order for the
removal of the case to the court of another jurisdiction
free from such objection and all records pertaining to
6

the case shall be transferred forthwith in such another
county.
In addressing the issue of pretrial publicity/ the Court in
State v. Wood, Utah, 638 P.2d 71, 88 (1982) , established that the
defendant has the burden of proving that a "fair and impartial
trial cannot be held in the county where the action is pending."
It is generally accepted that the defendant must show a
reasonable likelihood that, in the absence of relief such as a
change of venue, a fair trial cannot be had.

It is also generally

understood that a reasonable likelihood of prejudice does not mean
that prejudice must be more probable than not.

Fraizer v.

Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, 95 Cal. Rptr. 798, 486 P.2d
694 (1971); People v. Welch, 104 Cal. Rptr. 217, 501 P.2d 225
(1972); Brown v. State, 601 P.2d 221 (Ak. 1979).
The most recent Utah case addressing the pretrial publicity
issue is Codianna v. Morris, Utah, 660 P.2d 1101 (1983).

In

Codianna the Court recognized that:
An accused can be denied a fair trial where the
process of news gathering has allowed such a free
reign that it intrudes into every aspect of a trial
and creates a "carnival atmosphere" and where the
publicity is so weighted against the defendant and
so extreme in its impact that members of the jury
are encouraged to form strong preconceived views
of his guilt. Id_. at 1111; Shepherd v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333, 358, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1519, 16 L.Ed 2d
600 (1966).
Although other murder trials in Utah have received even more
notoriety and press attention, the attention given this case was
particularly prejudicial to the client.

In his arguments to the

trial court regarding a change of venue, defendant's attorney
7

expressed three major reasons justifying an order for a change of
venue:

(a) the murder victim was the aunt of the Provo City Chief

of Police, Swen Neilsen; (b) the defendant was black; and (c) the
trial was being held in Provo, a community which is predominantly
white and Mormon (R. 357-397, 403-407).

These three factors

subjected the defendant to a three-fold threat of prejudice.
Swen Neilsen, the Provo City Chief of Police, testified that
he conducted a press conference on February 28, 1985, the day
after the murder of his aunt occurred (R. 368) . He indicated
that media from Utah County and other adjoining counties,
including newspapers, radio and television, were present at that
press conference (R. 369). Subsequently, he was also
interviewed individually by stations from Salt Lake City (R.
369).

Throughout all media coverage, including television

coverage at the scene of the night of the incident, the media
clearly announced his position in the community as police chief
and his family relationship to Mrs. Oleson (R. 369).
Since the chief of police in any city represents one of the
highest offices in that jurisdiction, public notice naturally
attaches as soon as any relative of that official dies at the
hands of another person.

It is easy to see that there exists, in

any case such as the instant case, a reasonable likelihood of
prejudice against the defendant who is charged with such a murder.
The attendant publicity in this case certainly created an
atmosphere in Utah County and the city of Provo which denied the
defendant an impartial jury and a fair trial.
8

Defense counsel also pointed out to the court the
impossibility of obtaining an impartial jury and a fair trial in a
community such as Provo where black people make up less than
two percent of the population and where the predominant religion
(Mormonism) has had a history of some apparent discrimination
(R. 406). As defense counsel stated,
We must
is a black
death of a
comes into
(R. 407).

deal with facts as facts are. The defendant
man, he is a black man on trial for the
white woman. To add, in addition to that, he
court with a big, black lawyer from Chicago

It is clear that these three factors combined deprived the
defendant of an impartial, unprejudiced jury and a fair trial.

He

was a black man in an almost totally white and Mormon community
accused of murdering the aunt of a well-known public official.
The case had acquired substantial notoriety in the local and
statewide media, including newspapers, television and radio.

The

trial court certainly abused its discretion when it denied the
defendant's motion for a change of venue.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING
PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE HOMICIDE VICTIM WHICH WERE UNDULY
PREJUDICIAL AND NOT PROBATIVE OF ESSENTIAL FACTS.
Rule 403 of the Utah Fules of Evidence allows for the
exclusion of relevant evidence when "its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,11 or other problems.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, in relation to a challenge that
photographs of the victim were unduly prejudicial, "photographs
9

that are gruesome are not inadmissible if they are probative of
essential facts, even though they may be cumulative of other
evidence."

State v. Garcia, Utah, 663 P.2d 60, 63 (1983).

The

"key consideration in the application of this rule," the Court
held, was "the relevance of the photographs." Id.

The court has

held that slides of a victim1s body have "no probative value" when
"[a]11 the iraterial facts which could conceivably have been
adduced from viewing of the slides had been established by
uncontradicted lay and medical testimony."
441 P.2d 512, 515 (1968).

State v. Poe, Utah,

In the instant case, as in the Poe

case, the record clearly establishes that any material fact which
the photographs might have established had already been
established by uncontradicted testimony; therefore, the
photographs should not have been admitted.
The trial court determined that the photographs were not
cumulative and admitted the photographs of the victim for the
reasons stated by the prosecution as evidence of the crime or the
manner of its occurrence (P.. 1105, 1107, 1109, 1113, 1118).
However, this information or evidence was to be or had already
been established and was uncontradicted.

Therefore, the

photographs were merely repetitious of evidence already before the
jury.
Exhibit #5, a photograph of the crime scene, was offered,
according to the prosecution, to depict the victim1s body, the
knife, and "other things in the room" (P.. 1104).

Thereafter,

Exhibits 6, 8, 12 and 16 were introduced and admitted as evidence.

10

These exhibits were all photographs of portions of the body of the
victim which focused on death-causing wounds of the victim.
latter exhibits were clearly duplicitous of Exhibit #5.

The

The

gruesomeness of the photographs of the victim's body riddled
with stab wounds and gunshot wounds is undeniable/ so much so that
it is extremely unlikely that the jury could have overcome
feeling of passion, prejudice or hatred toward the
defendant.

This is especially true in light of the fact that all

of the evidence portrayed in the photographs was independently
produced by witness testimony, i.e. Bradley A. Leatham (R.
1101-1126)/ George Pierpont (R. 1180-1219)/ Sharon I. Schnittker/
medical examiner (R. 1271-1282) .
While the Court in Garcia determined that photographs may be
admissible even though they are cumulative of other evidence, the
cumulative effect of gruesome photographs is an essential element
in determining whether the probative value is minimized and
outweighed by the prejudicial effect.

This Court, in the case of

State v. Poe/ 21 Utah 2nd 113/ 441 P.2d 512 (1968) found that the
trial court abused its discretion by admitting autopsy photographs
of a homicide victim's dissected brain cavity to illustrate the
path of the fatal bullets.

There was no question in that case that

the victim had died as a result of bullet wounds to the head.
This Court held that it was reversible error to admit the
photographs when "all the material facts which could conceivably
have been adduced from a viewing of the slides had been
established by uncontradicted lay and medical testimony" and the
11

sole purpose for introducing the evidence was to "inflame and
arouse the jury."
In the case of State v. Wells, 6C3 P.2d 810 (1979) this Court
found that photographs of a homicide victim had no essential
evidentiary value because the evidence depicted was already before
the jury through the testimony of the medical examiner and that
evidence was not contested by the defendant.

Therefore, the

photographs were "superfluous" and had no evidentiary value except
the "hoped-for emotional impact on the jury."
The Supreme Court of the State of Montana in State
v. Allies, 606 P.2d 1043 (1980) held that the trial court had
committed reversible error by admitting pictures that were
"extremely gruesome and quite capable of inflaming the minds of
the jury."

As a basis for this determination the Allies court

held that the photograph's demonstrative purpose (including
position of the bodies at the scene) "could have been and was
established (by the medical examiner) without the use of the
photographs."
In a recent decision, this Court in State v0Cloud, 34 Utah
Advanced Reports 39 (ttci, 1986) held that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting photographs of the victim.
In Cloud, the State introduced several photographs of the
victim that showed the following:

(a) the victim as she was

discovered by the police, fully clothed, lying face down on the
floor in a pool of coagulated blood; (b) the body after it had
been turned over, lying face up in the pool of blood, and (c)
12

close-ups of three defensive wounds suffered by the victim, one in
the arm pit and two on her hands.

The State used these

photographs to argue that, given the nature of the attack and the
number of wounds inflicted, the defendant acted v/ith the intent
necessary to sustain a conviction of second degree murder*

This

Court, citing the Garcia case stated, that "potentially prejudicial
photographs are generally inappropriate and should not be admitted
in evidence unless they have an essential evidentiary value that
outweighs their unfairly prejudicial impact."

This Court found

that the trial court had erred in misapprehending the law as
announced in the Garcia case.

The prosecutor in the Cloud case

did not suggest that the photographs had any "essential
evidentiary value," as that term is explained in Garcia.

Rather,

the prosecutor argued that the photographs were admissible because
they contained relevant evidence.

The court accepted the

prosecutor's argument and admitted the photographs.

This Court

concluded that the "photographs had no essential evidentiary
value."

This court further found that the photographs only showed

evidence which had already been "put before the jury readily and
accurately by other means not accompanied by the potential prejudice."

This Court reversed the conviction of the jury and

remanded the case for a new trial.
The facts in the present case are almost identical to those in
the Cloud case.

In the instant case, the prosecutor introduced

Exhibit #5, which was a picture of the victim and the crime scene
as it appeared undisturbed.

Thereafter the prosecution introduced
13

Exhibits 6, 8, 12 and 16.

Exhibits 8 and 16 were c]ose-up

pictures of the upper torso of the victim showing several stab
wounds in the victim's back.

Exhibit 12 was a close-up of the

skull of the victim taken during the autopsy showing bullet wounds
and bullet fragments.

The prosecution did not offer the evidence

as having any essential evidentiary value nor did he argue that it
did.

Counsel for the defendant/ on the other hand/ objected in

each case to the admission of the aforesaid exhibits stating that
they were duplicitousf inflammatory and very prejudicial to the
defendant's right to a fair trial.

All of H<e evidence depicted

in the photographs was additionally admitted through the testimony
of witnesses and was uncontradicted.

Officer Bradley £. Latham

testified about his findings at the crime scene, the location of
the body of the victim and other pertinent facts pertaining to the
crime scene (R. 1101-1126).

Epifinao Tovar testified regarding the

defendant's admission to him of defendant's

murder of the victim.

Mr. Tovar's testimony contained rather explicit evidence of the
crime scene and the nature and method of the crime (R. 1127-1180).
The State Medical Exar-inpr.- Sharer I. Schnittker testified at
length about the wounds to the victim, their location, their
effect, and her report was admitted as illustrative of her
testimony (R. 1271-1282).

There is no doubt the the

photographs of the victim are extremely gruesome and very
prejudicial, especially in light of the recent decisions of this
Court in the Garcia, P,oe, I.'ellg c>nc C2cud cases.

Due to the fact

that any purposes the photographs might have served were sufficiently
14

established and uncontradicted, their actual purpose was only to
incite tna jurors1 passions, disgust, hatred and vengeance,
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE DEPENDANT'S
CONFESSION WAS ADMISSIBLE, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS INDUCED BY
A PROMISE NOT TO PROSECUTE THE DEFENDANT'S GIRL FRIEND.
The law is clear that in order for a confession to be received
into evidence against a defendant, the confession must be voluntary.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 492 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed.
2d 854 (1973).

A voluntary confession is one that is freely and

voluntarily given without coercion induced by fear or threat of
harm and without inducement by promising or holding out hope of
reward or benefit for the defendant or a person that he is closely
associated with.

29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence 543 (1967).

Any

confession which is obtained by direct or implied promise, however
slight, is not voluntary. Bram vs. United States, 168 U.S. 352, 18
St. Ct. 1985, 42 L. Ed. 568 (1897).
To determine whether a particular inducement is unlawful the
court must weigh the facts and circumstances surrounding the
defendant's confession, as well as his age, intelligence, emotional
state, mental and physical condition of the accused.

Thomas vs.

Arizona, 356 U.S. 390, 78 S.Ct. 885, 2 L.Ed 2d 863 (1958).

All of

these factors must be considered in determining whether the
inducement offered by the law enforcement officials is sufficient
to induce the defendant to confess because what might be
sufficient to bring about on person's confession might be insufficient to induce anotherfs confession.
15

Certain interrogation techniques can work a subtly coercive
effect on the defendant without overtly soliciting the defendant
for information or without offering a direct inducement to the
defendant for his confession.

For example/ one need only examine

the circumstances surrounding the famed "Christian burial"
interrogation to find an instance of an indirect comment which
caused that defendant to make an incriminating statement.

Brewer

vs. Williams/ 430 U.S. 387/ 97 S.Ct. 1232/ 51 L.Ed. 2d 424 (1977).
The Supreme Court in Blackburn vs. Alabama/ 361 UPS* 199/ 206; 80
S.Ct. 274/ 4 L.Ed.2d 282 (1960)/ observed:

"A number of cases

have demonstrated...that the efficiency of the rack and thumbscrew
can be matched/ given the proper subject/ by mere sophisticated
modes of 'persuasion.fw
When one considers the defendant in the instant case/ his age/
intelligence/ mental condition and all the attendent circumstances
surrounding the defendant's confession, one must conclude that his
confession was involuntarily given and therefore/ inadmissible
The defendant was interviewed for two consecutive daysf each
interview lasting approximately five hours. When the defendant
was arrested he was taken from the apartment of his girlfriend/
JoAnn Robins/ who has three small children.

As the defendant

was taken away by the police officers/ he overheard them
saying that Ms. Robins was going to be arrested for
harboring a fugitive (R. 315) . Later during the first
interrogation by Sergeant Cunningham, the subject of Ms. Robins
was raised again.

Sergeant Cunningham stated that if the
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defendant would help him, the sergeant would help JoAnn (R. 314) „
^he defencert understood that if he confessed to the crime under
investigation that Ms. Robins would be released (R. 315). The
police officer denies that he made any promises concerning Ms.
Robins to the defendant.

He does not dispute that he said Ms.

Robins was going to go to prison for helping the defendant.

Each

time the defendant questioned the officer concerning Ms. Robins,
the officer responded that she would be going to prison.

The

officer could tell that the defendant clearly felt some
responsibility towards Ms. Robins and, rather than alleviate the
defendant's concerns towards Ms. Robins, he intentionally
heightened the defendant's anxiety and emotional state by telling
him that she was going to prison.

The defendant was already aware

that she had been arrested; he had seen her in the jail holding
area (R. 315). Every time the defendant asked the officer
if she was still locked up, the officer would reply that she was
going to prison.

According to the defendant this happened five or

six times during each interview session (R. 316). The officer
even told the defendant that Ms. Robins' children would be placed
in a foster home if she went to prison.

The defendant knew that

Ms. Robins was not involved and that she had been kind enough to
take him into her apartment.

He did not want the children to be

separated from their mother.

Although the officers involved in

the interrogation deny that they made any promises concerning Ms.
Robins or her fate, they were aware that the defendant was greatly
concerned about her and her fate (R. 280). They used that concern
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to psychologically pressure the defendant until he finally
confessed.

Never once did the officers make any disclaimer that

the defendant's actions would be weighed separately from Ms.
Robins1 involvement.

They allowed the defendant to feel

responsible for the fact that Ms. Robins would go to prison
without even telling him that her case would be evaluated
separately on its own merits.

By not doing this, the officer

played upon the defendant's belief that if he confessed she
would be released.

He did not have to overtly make a promise

or an offer of an inducement:
possibility,

he only had to suggest the

it is clear from the evidence that the officer

used defendant's concern for his girl friend to obtain the
confession.
Where law enforcement officials have used a promise to release
a close relative or benefit a family member/ the courts have
routinely found that any subsequent confession is involuntary.
People v. Melius, 134 CaJ Apr. 219, 25 p.?c 2?7 (1933); People
v. Matlock, 336 P.2d 505 (1959); 80 A.L.R. 2d 1418 (1961).

In

People v. Trout, 54 Cal. 2d 576, 354 P.2d 231 (1960), the
California Supreme Court found from the uncontradicted evidence
that the defendant's confession was involuntary when the police
held his wife in custody away from her children.

There was an

implied threat or promise to the accused, irrespective of what
express words might or might not have been used by the police,
that his wife's release from custody was dependent upon his
confessing the crime.
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The Supreme Court has held confessions involuntary where there
has been a threat to take the defendant's wife into custody or
where the police have threatened to have the defendant's
children placed in foster care.

Roger v. Richmond, 355 U.S.

534, 81 S.Ct. 785, 5 L. Ed. 2d 760 (1961); Lynuum v. Illinois,
372 U.S. 528, 83 St. Ct. 917, 9 L. Ed. 2d 922 (1963).
In Ferguson v. Boyd, 566 F.2d 873 (4th Cir. 1977), the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that promising to release the
accused's girl friend if he confessed was an inducement rendering
the confession involuntary.

It noted that a confession can

be exacted by mental coercion and the real question is whether the
pressure in whatever form was sufficient to overcome the
defendant's will and his capacity for self-determination.
Further, the Court rejected the notion that the detention of a
live-in girl friend does not have the same legal consequences as
the detention of a wife or relative.

It pointed out that the

determination should be based on the impact of the circumstances
rather than the legal relationship of the parties.

Ferguson v.

Boyd, 566 F. 2d 878 (Note 7 ) .
The defendant's confession was given under similar
circumstances as Boyd's and should be held to be involuntary.
therefore, is inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution which has been made applicable to the states.

19

It,

POINT IV
UTAHfS SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS STATUTE FOR CAPITAL FELONY
CASES VIOLATES DUE PROCESS BECAUSE THE STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTORS, WHICH ARE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF THE
CAPITAL CRIME, ARE ALSO THE AGGRAVATING FACTORS CONSIDERED
BY THE JURY IN DETERMINING WHETHER TO IMPOSE THE DEATH
SENTENCE.
In Furman vs. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, (1972) the Supreme Court
reversed the death sentence imposed upon the defendant and held
that the death penalty could not be imposed under sentencing
procedures that created a substantial risk that the penalty would
be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.

The effect of

that holding was to deem unconstitutional many of the capital
punishment statutes throughout the United States.

As a result, a

majority of the states, including Utah, modified or rewrote their
capital punishment statutes in order to comply with the
constitutional standards required under Furman.

One of the

developments adopted by several states, including Utah, is a
bifurcation of the trial into an initial guilt-innocence phase and
a subsequent penalty phase.

Drafters of the Model Penal Code, as

quoted in Gregg vs. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 191 (1976), concluded:
[If a unitary proceeding is used] the determination of
the punishment must be based on less than all the
evidence that has a bearing on that issue, such, for
example, as a previous criminal record of the accused,
or evidence must be admitted on the ground that it is
relevant to sentence, though it would be excluded as
irrelevant or prejudicial with respect to guilt or
innocence alone. Trial lawyers understandably have
little confidence in a solution that admits evidence
and trusts to an instruction to the jury that it should
be considered only in determining the penalty and
disregarded in assessing guilt.
The obvious solution ... is to bifurcate the
proceeding, abiding strictly by the Rules of Evidence
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until and unless there is a conviction, but once guilt
has been determined opening the record to further
information that is relevant to sentence. This is the
analog of the procedure in the ordinary case when
capital punishment is not an issue; the court conducts
a separate inquiry before imposing sentence.
ALI Model Penal Code, Section 201.6, Comment 5, pages
74-75, (Tent. Draft #9, 1959).
The purpose, then, of the bifurcated trial is to permit a
limitation on the evidence admitted to avoid unfair prejudice to
the defendant during the jury's determination of guilt or
innocence.

After the determination of guilt, the penalty phase of

the trial begins.

In that phase,

[elvicence may be presented as to any matter the court
deems relevent to sentence, including but not limited
to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the
defendant's character, background, history, mental
and physical condition, and any other facts in
aggravation or mitigation of the penalty. Any
evidence the court deems to have probative force may
be received regardless of its admissibility under the
exclusionary rules of evidence. Utah Code Ann.,
§ 76-3-207(2).
The purpose of broadening the scope of evidence to be
considered by the jury is to permit the defendant to present
evidence of factors which mitigate against imposition of the death
penalty.

Often this evidence would be inadmissible in the

guilt-innocence phase of the trial because of its irrelevance in
determining guilt.
Another reason for bifurcation of the trial as indicated by
the drafters of the Model Penal Cede quoted above is that the jury
often cannot distinquish between evidence which should be
considered only in determining the penalty and disregard it in
assessing guilt.

The Supreme Court has recognized that there are

21

limitations on a juryfs ability to disregard incriminating
evidence against a defendant despite limiting instructions from
the court.

In Bruton vs. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1967),

evidence of a confession by the defendant implicating his
co-defendant was admitted.

The defendant invoked his right not to

testify and, therefore, the co-defendant could not cross-examine
the defendant.

The trial court instructed the jury to consider

the evidence only in determining the guilt of the defendant but
not the co-defendant.

The Supreme Court said "We hold that,

because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions
to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial
statements in determining [co-defendant's] guilt, admission
of [defendant's] confession in this joint trial violated
co-defendant's right of cross-examination secured by the
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment."
Similarly, in Jackson vs> Denno, 378 U.S.368 (1963), the New
York practice had been to submit the issue of voluntariness of a
confession to the jury along with the determination of guilt or
innocence.

The jury was told that, if it found the confession

involuntary, it was to disregard it entirely, and determine guilt
or innocence solely from the other evidence in the case;
alternatively, if it found the confession voluntary, it was to
determine its truth or reliability and afford it weight
accordingly.

The Supreme Court said that "the New York procedure

poses substantial threats to a defendant's constitutional rights
to have an involunatry confession entirely disregarded and to have
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the coercion issue fairly and reliably determined.
we cannot ignore."

IcL at 389.

These hazards

The Supreme Court held that the

New York procedure was a violation of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and that the determination of
voluntariness of confession must be determined in an independent
hearing to avoid unfair prejudice to the defendant.
Under Utah law, the defendant in the instant case was charged
with first-degree murder.

During the trial phase the jury was

required to determine two issues:

First/ whether criminal

homicide had been committed in connection with one aggravating
factor# thereby enhancing the crime to first-degree murder/ and
second/ whether the defendant was guilty of committing the act of
first-degree murder.

The Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202 states:

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first
degree if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes
the death of another under any of the following circumstances. ...
(d) The homicide was committed while the actor was
engaged in the commission of/ or an attempt to commit
... aggravated burglary.•."
(q) The homicide was committed in an especially
heinous/ atrocious, cruel/ or exceptionally depraved
manner, any of which must be demonstrated by physicial
torture/ serious physical abuse, or serious bodily
injury to the victim before death.
(2) Murder in the first degree is a capital offense.
In the instant case, the defendant was found guilty in a jury
trial of first-degree murder because of the presence of the two
enhancing or aggravating factors listed in (d) and (q) of the
statute.
Upon conviction of a capital felony, Utah Code Ann. Sections
76-3-206 and 76-3-2C7 control the penalty phase of the bifurcated
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trial*
—

During the penalty phase, the jury has one issue before it

whether the defendant is sufficently culpable for his act

warranting imposition of the death sentence.

During the penalty

phase the jury must consider the aggravating factors as compared
to the total mitigating factors.

The jury must be persuaded

beyond a reasonable doubt that total aggravating factors outweigh
total mitigating factors and they must be further persuaded
beyond a reasonable doubt that the imposition of the death penalty
is justified and appropriate under the circumstances.

State vs.

Wood, Utah, 648 P.2d 71 (1981).
Section 76-3-207 lists seven statutory mitigating factors
which may be considered and refers to Utah Code Ann., Section
76-5-202 for the list of statutory aggravating factors.

These

statutory aggravating factors are the same factors which the jury
has already considered in finding the defendant guilty of
first-degree murder in the guilt-innocence phase of the trial.
However, the purpose of the penalty phase is not to determine
guilt, but rather culpablility and sentence.

Because the only

statutory aggravating factors to be considered during the penalty
phase are those for which the defendant has already been found
guilty, the jury is prejudiced against the defendant regarding
those factors.
The distinction that the jury must make between the purpose of
the guilt-innocence phase of the trial and the penalty phase is
too obscure and approaches the same degree of mental gymnastics as
was required by the trial courts in Jackson vs. Denno, supra and
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Bruton v. United States, supra.

The jury enters the penalty

phase of the trial believing beyond a reasonable doubt that the
aggravating factors are present*

This statutory scheme shifts the

burden of proof from the State to the defendant.

The defendant

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the total mitigating
factors outweigh total aggravating factors and that, therefore,
the death penalty is inappropriate in his case.
The capital punishment statutes of Georgia and Florida, which
were deemed constitutional in Gregg v. Georgia, supra and Proffit
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) do not list the elements of the
capital crime as aggravating factors.

In contrast, the Utah

statute, Section 76-3-207, incorporates by reference Section
76-5-202 as the only statutory aggravating factors.

This

significant difference in the Utah statute, shifts the burden of
proof to the defendant, is highly prejudicial, and violates due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The scope of review established for reviewing alleged error in
the penalty phase of a capital case was stated in State v. Wood,
Utah, 648 P.2d 71 (1981).

The Court said that "in the penalty

phase it is our duty to determine whether the sentence of death
resulted from error, prejudice, or arbitrariness, or was
disproportionate.11

The shifing of the burden of proof caused by

the mental gymnastics required of jurors by this statute causes
great prejudice to the defendants in capital cases and produces
arbitrary and disproportionate results in the sentencing in
capital cases.

This error is so prejudicial that it violates the
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defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and
therefore the death sentence as determined by the jury should be
reversed in the instant case.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY THAT IT COULD CONSIDER ANY EVIDENCE WHICH HAD
BEEN ADMITTED IN THE GUILT PORTION OF THE TRIAL IN
ADDITION TO THE EVIDENCE ADMITTED IN THE PENALTY PORTION.
The trial court instructed the jury in the penalty phase, that
the jury could consider "...all of the evidence produced either by
the State or the defendant throughout the guilt phase or penalty
phase at the trial."

(R. 179)

Utah Code Ann., Section

76-3-207(2) outlines the evidence that may be admitted during the
penalty phase of a capital case.

This provision does not provide

that the jury may consider evidence introduced during the guilt
phase.
The prosecutor relied heavily in his closing arguments in the
penalty phase on evidence not introduced in the penalty phase.
He referred to evidence describing the victim's body and the brutal
nature of the murder (R. 1437-1440).

Much of his argument was

based upon evidence produced in the guilt phase of the trial.
This procedure denies the defendant due process in that the
defendant does not have the opportunity to object to evidence
which may have been competent during the guilt phase, but would be
objectionable if offered during the penalty phase.

For example,

the evidence of prior criminal activity of a defendant for which he
had not been convicted may have had some relevance in the guilt
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phase, but should have been excluded in the penalty phase.
In addition to the problem of admissibilityr the more serious
due process violation is the difficulty of determining and
rationally reviewing the process and evidence upon which the jury
based its determination that the death penalty was appropriate and
that the totality of mitigating factors was outweighed by the
totality of the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.
The imposition of any standard of procedure or process of
determination is constitutionally flawed if there is no effective
means of review.

It is difficult to perceive how this Court can

make meaning of the evidence and factors upon which the jury based
its consideration of the death penalty issues.

The trial court

did not require the jury to make any specific findings as to the
factors or evidence they considered.

Even had the juryfs

consideration been limited to the evidence introduced at the
penalty phase, this court would have a difficult test.

However,

the overly broad invitation of the court to consider "any and all"
evidence introduced during the guilt and penalty phase imposes an
impossible test upon the appellate court.

In Gardner v. Florida,

supra at 361, the United Stated Supreme Court stated:
Since the state must administer its capital sentencing
procedures with an even hand, it is important that the
record on appeal disclose to the reviewing court the
considerations which motivated the death sentence in
every case in which it is imposed. Without full
disclosure of the basis for the death sentences, the
Florida capital sentencing procedures would be subject
to the defects which resulted in the holding of
unconstitutionality in Furman v. Georgia.
The trial court violated the defendant's right to procedural
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due process by allowing the jury to consider matters not
introduced in the penalty phase, since no meaningful review can be
had of the factors upon which the jury based their decision to
impose the death penalty.
CONCLUSION
The court committed prejudicial error by failing to grant a
change of venue*

In view of the unusually concentrated and

regionally publicized nature of this case, this failure to change
venue resulted in a panel of jurors who were more than casually
informed of the case.
The trial court committed error in allowing admission of
photographs of the victim which were unduly prejudicial,
inflammatory and not probative of essential facts. The chance
that the jury would base its decision out of passion was
enhanced by such evidence.

The photos were not necessary to

establish any facts, and were cumlative of the other competent
evidence introduced.
The trial court committed error by failing to grant
defendant's Motion to Suppress.

The defendant's confession was

not voluntary, but was induced by police officers who led
defendant to believe that unless he connfessed to the crime under
investigation, an innocent girl friend and her children would
suffer.
Utahfs statutory scheme, in which the statutory aggravating
factors, also elements of the capital crime, are also the
aggravating factors considered by the jury in determining whether
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to impose the death penalty, violates due process.

The jurors

who have convicted the defendant have already found beyond a
reasonable doubt the aggravating factors during the guilt phase.
They are then instructed that they must find aggravating factors
in the penalty phase and apply the same reasonable doubt standard.
The jurors are already predisposed toward death because finding
that the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt requires some mental gymnastics that are
extremely difficult/ if not impossible, for a layperson to do.
Reasonable minds could not have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that the totality of the aggravating factors completely
outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that the imposition of the death penalty was justified and
appropriate under the circumstances.

There was substantial

evidence of mitigation and little evidence of aggravation, other
than the actual commission of the crime.
The court erred in allowing the jury to consider any evidence
which had been admitted during the guilt phase of the trial in
considering the penalty to be imposed.

Such procedure is not

susceptible to meaningful review, in that the reviewing court
cannot determine the validity of the factors which were considered
by the jury in arriving at their determination to impose the death
sentence.

It is, therefore, constitutionally infirm in that the

death penalty may be imposed in an arbitrary and discriminatory
manner.

Such procedure is further prejudicial in that there may

be evidence introduced during the guilt phase which is competent
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for a limited purpose, but which is not competent evidence should
it be offered in the penalty phase.
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